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Abstract I examine Reichenbach’s theory of relative a priori and Michael
Friedman’s interpretation of it. I argue that Reichenbach’s view remains at bottom
conventionalist and that one issue which separates Reichenbach’s account from Kant’s
apriorism is the problem of mathematical applicability. I then discuss Hermann Weyl’s
theory of blank forms which in many ways runs parallel to the theory of relative a
priori. I argue that it is capable of dealing with the problem of applicability, but with
a cost.
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1 Introduction
A view widespread already in the early 1900s was to see laws of nature as conventions.
A popular example was the statement:
Phosphorus melts at 44◦C. (1)
The melting temperature is not a sufficient characteristic, but a necessary one. Suppose
there is a given solid substance X . To verify whether X is phosphorus we heat it to
44◦C and observe its behaviour. If it starts melting, there are other tests to perform
for establishing the nature of X . If it fails, we raise a hypothesis that X is not in fact
phosphorus.
Far from believing in the essential attributes of phosphorus that scientists uncover
in the course of their experiments, many theorists believed that the statement (1)
contributes to the way we understand the term ‘phosphorus’. Empirical regularities
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observable in experiments affect the way we talk about material substances and the
way we describe the experimental outcome. If such is the role of laws, they become
akin to conventions, viz. arbitrary stipulations. I stipulate the term ‘phosphorus’ to
refer to the substance melting at 44◦C (plus a set of other characteristics), but there is
nothing wrong with you if you decide to stipulate the same term to refer to something
melting at 45◦C. All we have to do is to find a way to correlate our respective linguistic
habits. There is nothing wrong with either of those habits, since there is nothing in the
string of noises and shapes ‘phosphorus’ itself which singles out the
correct way of using it.
The parallel between laws and ordinary linguistic conventions is obvious: natural
languages are likewise the products of history, a result of explicit and implicit conven-
tions multiplied since time immemorial. Being conventions, laws are neither true, nor
false. Statements about conventions can be true or false, and similarly statements using
those conventions. The conventionalist view, in the form outlined here, is associated
with the name of Poincaré. Although Poincaré’s concern is geometry, it is thought that
conventionalism about geometry easily extends to conventionalism about physical
sciences. The common perception is reinforced by his explicit appeal to the analogy
with natural languages. Thus in Chap. III of Poincaré (1952) we find a little dictionary
allowing mutual translation of statements of Lobatchevsky’s and Euclidean geometry.
The common perception I am talking about is in point of fact misleading. Michael
Friedman contributed significantly to clarifying Poincaré’s real position, and I shall
say a few words about that below.
Even if we deny the conventional character of natural laws, one may be reluctant
to treat them as mere generalisations of observational data. That is, one may deny that
laws are both empirical and contingent. In recent years this point has been stressed
by Kripke’s theory metaphysical necessity elaborated in Lecture III of Kripke (1971,
1980). Kripke attributed metaphysical necessity to ‘theoretical identifications’ exactly
of the sort displayed by the statement (1). Some theorists subsequently sought to elim-
inate the gap between metaphysical necessity and physical necessity. Metaphysically
necessary statements receive their elevated modal status from certain very general
physical laws which govern theoretical identifications. What is particularly important
to us here is that Kripke regards the source of metaphysical necessity as being a priori.
If we now identify metaphysical necessity with physical necessity of a special kind,
then those general physical laws will in turn be known a priori.
As we all know, there is a venerable tradition, according to which laws of nature are
indeed known a priori. Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz should be counted among its
adherents despite significant and subtle differences between them. However, with the
advent of empiricism and naturalism the apriorist tradition has fallen out of favour. The
most sustained recent attempt to resuscitate it was made by Michael Friedman. His
studies of Kant’s philosophy of science showed that Kant, for better and for worse,
was part of that same tradition. If the first Critique is concerned chiefly with the
apriority of categories and pure intuition and tends to obscure Kant’s stance on natural
laws, even a cursory perusal of Kant (1996) makes it plain:
What can be called proper science is only that whose certainty is apodictic; cog-
nition that can contain mere empirical certainty is only knowledge improperly
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so-called. . . . A rational doctrine of nature thus deserves the name of a natural
science, only in case the fundamental natural laws therein are cognised a priori,
and are not mere laws of experience. etc. etc. (Kant 1996, p. 468)
Friedman’s ambition did not stop at merely making an historical correction vis-à-
vis Kant. His latest enquiries pursue a further twofold goal. One part of it consists
in showing the continuity between Kant’s thought and the Vienna Circle, including
Reichenbach (who resided in Berlin). That part of the project was started in Friedman
(1983) and articulated in Friedman (1999). The second part of the project is less histor-
ical. In Friedman (2001) it is argued that a version of the aprioristic conception is the
correct view on the nature of scientific theories. Furthermore, an aprioristic correction
of positivism would gain us a more balanced and plausible interpretation of Kuhn’s
historical data, as well as highlight the pitfalls of Quinean holism.
In what follows I shall critically review Friedman’s interpretation of Reichenbach
(1965). The main focus here will be on the notion of relative a priori and the tripartite
distinction of physical sciences. I shall then discuss an alternative view on the same
stock of issues due to Hermann Weyl.
2 Reichenbach on the relative a priori
The Kantian notion of synthetic a priori was thought to be compromised by the devel-
opment of non-Euclidean geometries. Whereas Kant claimed that the Euclidean geom-
etry is a priori true, the development of non-Euclidean geometries showed that it is not
to be believed a priori. The general theory of relativity (GTR) then showed that it is not
even true. Such was the reasoning prominent in the late 1910s. Reichenbach resists it
in Reichenbach (1965). His argument turns on distinguishing two connotations of a
priori in Kant. One such connotation relates to eternal truth, to being ‘true for all times’.
That is, S is a priori true just in case S is true at all times. This is an extraordinary view,
exegetically and in content. I do not have the German source handy here, but I trust
that the translation got it right. The view is remarkable, because Reichenbach’s Kant
is made committed to believing that statements, or judgements, are true at some times,
and false at other. This is a familiar medieval conception, perhaps also attributable to
Aristotle; but I doubt very much that Kant has ever expressed sympathy with it.
However, when we look at the textual evidence that Reichenbach gives in the foot-
note 17, we realise that no revolutionary exegesis is at stake. The first connotation of
a priori equates it with strict universality. That is, S is a priori true just in case S is
true in all possible circumstances. That formulation makes a link between apriority
and necessity. It also does not distinguish between synthetic apriority and analytic
apriority.1 The second connotation of a priori which Reichenbach attributes to Kant
relates to the construction of objects of experience. Our experience obeys certain rules
of organisation. The sensibility and the reason of the agent contribute to the way we
perceive the world, and they do that in accordance with rules. Therefore, within this
connotation, S is a priori just in case the truth-value of S is established solely through
those ‘constitutive’ rules of experience. Reichenbach does not provide any textual
1 For an attempt to draw such a distinction see Hanna (2001, Sects. 5.2–5.3).
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evidence for his second connotation, because, as he says, it ‘will not be disputed’. He
refers us to the Transcendental Deduction of the first Critique.
Now, Reichenbach’s idea is to discard the first connotation and to keep the second
one. Kantian rules that we have just mentioned are labelled as ‘axioms of coordination’
(synonymous with ‘coordinating principles’). Their role is in essence to control the
way we reason about observational data. Says Reichenbach:
The reality of things must be distinguished from the reality of concepts which,
insofar as one wishes to call them real, have a mere psychological existence. But
there remains a strange relation between the real thing and the concept, because
only the coordination of the concept defines the individual thing in the “contin-
uum” of reality; and only the conceptual connection decides on the basis of per-
ceptions whether a conceived individual thing “is there in reality”. (Reichenbach
1965, pp. 50–51)
This is the situation, according to Reichenbach, in analytic geometry. There we have
algebraic representations of geometrical concepts. Thus, upon fixing the coordinate
cross we can determine a one-parameter family of curves by the algebraic function
f (x, y, z) = 0. In the case of Euclidean geometry, such a principle is embodied in the
Euclidean metric which fixes the relation which is to be obtained for a collection of
spatial points to form a spatially extended body. Similarly, we may coordinate certain
mathematical symbols for vectors with physical forces and thereby conceive the latter
as objects having vector-like properties.
By discarding the first connotation of a priori we maintain that the Euclidean geome-
try is not necessarily, or universally, true. What does that mean? Here, I think, Reichen-
bach’s reasoning becomes fairly difficult to understand. On one hand, Reichenbach
interprets apriority qua necessity and universality as immunity to revision.2 On the
other hand, he effectively claims that revisability of coordinating principles does not
amount to their ‘total’ falsehood. They should never be abandoned in their entirety
as we might abandon a revised, viz. false, generalisation. Rather, we should always
seek to replace them with those principles which differ from them only with respect
to a limited number of instances of the available data. Reichenbach elaborates in the
following key passage:
Until now all results of physics have been obtained by means of the self-evident
system. We discovered that this fact does not exclude a contradiction the exis-
tence of which can be ascertained—but how shall we obtain a new system?
With respect to individual laws, this aim is easily reached because only those
presuppositions that contain the individual law have to be changed. But we have
seen that all laws contain coordinating principles, and if we wish to test new
coordinating principles inductively, we must first change every physical law. It
would indeed be nonsensical to test new principles by means of experiences
still presupposing the old principles. If, for instance, space were tentatively
assumed to be four-dimensional, to test the assumption, all methods of mea-
suring lengths used until now would have to be abandoned and to be replaced
2 See Reichenbach (1965, p. 55).
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by a measurement compatible with four-dimensionality. Furthermore, all laws
concerning the behavior of the material used in the measuring instrument, con-
cerning the velocity of light, and so forth, would have to be given up. Such
a procedure would be technically impossible. We cannot start physics all over
again. (Reichenbach 1965, pp. 67–68)
Interestingly, Reichenbach gives only pragmatic reasons for the ‘lax’ replacement of
the old coordinating principles. The old principles are nothing but inductive approxi-
mations of the new ones. We, therefore, get a familiar chart of the cumulative devel-
opment of science, in which theories—as time goes by—‘improve’, whether that
means accounting for more and more phenomena or getting closer and closer to truth
(although the cumulative chart might not require postulating any one single unreach-
able true theory). This is a view current among practicing scientists. Let us call it ‘the
Folk View’. Kepler’s laws, according to that view, are regarded as approximations of
Newton’s laws. The laws of stationary electric and magnetic fields are regarded as
approximations of Maxwell’s equations. Some of these will no doubt qualify as what
Reichenbach terms ‘axioms of connection’, that is, ordinary physical laws which are
mere generalisations from experience. But of course the Folk View respects no sharp
distinction between axioms of connection and axioms of coordination. For instance,
a typical authoritative textbook tells us:
Subatomic particles behave in a more complex way than the material points of
the classical mechanics. The classical picture only approximately reflects the
laws of nature. (Sivoukhin 1979, Sect. 5)
Newton’s theory of gravitation was further developed in Einstein’s general the-
ory of relativity. This latter gives not an intuitive explanation of gravitation, but
a new way of describing it and a generalisation of Newton’s theory. (Sivoukhin
1979, Sects. 55–57)
The theory of relativity and quantum mechanics are more general theories than
Newtonian mechanics. The latter is contained in them as an approximate lim-
iting instance. Relativistic mechanics merges into Newtonian mechanics in the
case of low velocities. Quantum mechanics merges into Newtonian mechanics
in the case of sufficiently massive bodies moving in smoothly varying fields.
(Sivoukhin 1979, Sects. 0–5; italics added)
According to the Folk View, then, the new principles extend the area of application
of the old principles. The replacement of old principles is nothing but generalisation.
Perhaps we should better talk about old principles being ‘superseded’ by new ones.
Now, Reichenbach’s view amounts to the introduction of different standards of
revision. Empirical laws, or the axioms of connection, may be abandoned in the
course of scientific development as a result of obtaining new evidence. Coordinating
principles of a given theory are those statements of the theory which are superseded,
rather than completely abandoned, by their successors. However, Reichenbach sup-
plies no systematic reason for thinking that there is a sharp distinction between two
families of principles. The distinction appears to be based on a practical impossibility.
Therefore, I think, Reichenbach’s conception of the relative a priori resembles the Folk
View more closely than one might expect: the latter equally insists on incorporating
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the fundamental laws of the earlier theories into the novel ones.3 The earlier laws are
approximations, or limiting cases, of the novel laws. We shall see in a moment that
this resemblance is not accidental.
3 Friedman’s programme
Quinean holism regards all individual beliefs as being inserted in a network. Aban-
doning one belief impinges on holding other beliefs in the network. To borrow John
Carriero’s apt metaphor, it is as if the web of belief is composed of infinitely viscous
fluid-like matter where the smallest local change reverberates throughout its farthest
reaches. Therefore, no principled distinction between the a priori and the empirical
is possible. If revising one belief on empirical grounds forces an adjustment of the
whole network, logical and mathematical beliefs would also appear empirical.
And holistic explanations seem congruent with Kuhn’s picture of scientific change.
Since statements are never to be checked individually, but only as part of ‘theories’,
those theories cannot be compatible. We can expand the notion of theory to include
standards of experimentation, relevant textbooks, and so forth. We will then obtain
Kuhn’s notion of structural lexicon. Projecting the resulting view on the history of a
particular discipline, we will get a sequence of isolated paradigms eliminating each
other without a trace.
Friedman resists both Quinean holism and Kuhn’s picture of scientific change.4
His programme laid out in Friedman (2001) has many aspects, but these two of them
seem to me the most important ones. More specifically, his claims are as follows:
Contra Quine: historical developments in mathematical physics show that there
is a hierarchy of beliefs. Mathematical beliefs are a priori and properly physical
are empirical. There is a third class of beliefs characterised as relative a priori
which mediates between the mathematical and the physical parts of the theory.
Contra Kuhn: historical developments in mathematical physics show that there
is far more continuity in successive paradigms than Kuhn allows. The fact of
continuity is to be explained by the class of relative a priori beliefs.
I will have little to say about Friedman’s polemic with Kuhn. As far as I can tell, Fried-
man happily endorses the Folk View in the outline. However, an important insight of
Kuhn’s is preserved in that the a priori framework of an earlier theory cannot accom-
modate the framework of the later one. It is only in a retrospect, from a historical
point of view, when we are already in possession of a later, ‘expanded’ theoretical
framework, that we make sense of the earlier one.5
I will predominantly focus on the notion of relative a priori. Friedman derives it
from Reichenbach (1965). The historical claim here is that before the logical positiv-
ists, and in particular Schlick and Reichenbach, adopted a thoroughly conventionalist
outlook, they toyed with the idea of adapting the Kantian a priori to the development
3 Coffa draws a similar conclusion: see Coffa (1991, p. 203).
4 See also Friedman (2001).
5 See Friedman (2001, 63ff, 96ff). For a criticism see van Fraassen (2006, pp. 300–303).
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of relativistic mechanics. The result is a tripartite division of statements of physical
theory. Apart from mathematical and empirical statements we also have a third class of
relative a priori statements. They comprise mechanics which is sharply distinguished
from the main body of physics.
In Friedman’s hands, Reichenbach navigates skillfully between orthodox Kantian-
ism, Poincaré’s conventionalism, and Helmholtzean empiricism. Relativised a priori
is not a Kantian a priori, since there is a way in which it is revisable. It is, on the
other hand, not a mere empirical law, since it occupies a different place in the hier-
archy of our knowledge. Not only it is never fully abandoned, but also the scope
of admissible evidence depends on which principles are accepted as relative a priori.
For instance, classical mechanics allows absolute contraction, and therefore, treats
length as an absolute property of bodies. Not so in special relativity, where length
becomes dependent on the frame of reference. That relativisation of length in Lorentz
transformations is very clearly not an empirical generalisation.
Yet, why should one insist on regarding it as an a priori principle, and not a
convention? In many ways Poincaré’s conventionalism occupies middle ground
in the debate over the synthetic a priori. A convention does not reflect a prop-
erty of reality, at least not literally, nor does it reflect our capacities allowing us
to gain knowledge prior to all experience. Conversely, it is not an empirical state-
ment: it would hardly be intelligible to try to test a convention by observation. If
Reichenbach could successfully differentiate himself from Poincaré, he would be
able to defend a second alternative position intermediate between apriorism and
empiricism. From a historical perspective, too, the issue holds special importance
for understanding Schlick’s criticism of Reichenbach’s 1920 book. Schlick inter-
preted the relative a priori as a form of convention. Reichenbach eventually came
to accept Schlick’s criticism and endorsed conventionalism, albeit with qualifica-
tions.6 If a second intermediate position is available, Schlick would have misinter-
preted Reichenbach, while the latter would have failed to see the novelty of his own
approach.
4 The ghost of convention
One key distinction between the relative a priori and the empirical lies in the way
they are revisable. Empirical generalisations can be subjected to experimental tests
and can be retained or abandoned depending on the results of those tests. Relative a
priori statements behave differently. Consider the familiar story of the light principle
of special relativity.7 It is not established by the Michelson–Morley experiment. The
latter does not show the constant velocity of light in all inertial frames: it only shows
that there are no identifiable differences in the velocity of light in different frames.
Lorentz’s electrodynamics, based on Newtonian mechanics, was developed with the
express purpose of accommodating the results of the experiment. Special relativity
6 See e.g. Reichenbach (1958, pp. 35–36). The Schlick–Reichenbach exchange is discussed in Coffa
(1991, pp. 202–203) and Friedman (1999, pp. 62–68).
7 See Friedman (2001, pp. 87–88).
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makes, therefore, a leap, unsupported by empirical input of the Michelson-Morley,
when it postulates the light principle. Einstein uses it to define simultaneity and the
new metric of the spatiotemporal framework. The Newtonian framework and the
associated Euclidean metric were unseated as a result, not of an experimentum crucis,
but of Einstein’s postulation.
A Quinean holist reads this story as being essentially incomplete. True, there is no
one experiment that would serve as a tiebreaker between alternative metrics. But there
were multiple empirical results, notably in electrodynamics, that motivated the search
for a non-Euclidean metric. The apriorist’s rejoinder is swift. Whatever motivation
there was, it is at best a biographical episode. It is not sufficient to justify the choice
of the new metric. The crucial factor involved in that choice was not coming from
empirical testing.
It is though much less clear how an apriorist fares against a conventionalist. From
the introduction of the Minkowskian metric the conventionalist is happy to learn his
conventionalist lesson: the light principle was a convention. Friedman and Fried-
man’s Reichenbach insist that it is an a priori statement. What is really at stake
here beyond the terminological distinction? In one sense, the answer is relatively
straightforward and uncomplicated. As Reichenbach notes in the very beginning of
Reichenbach (1965), general relativity refuted Poincaré’s conventionalism. It showed
that Euclidean geometry no longer represents the geometry of physical space–time.
The curvature depends on the distribution of matter. And since the metric is chosen on
the basis of physical considerations, geometry is transformed into a properly empirical
science.
But it is not a very satisfactory response. For it deals with a narrow conception of
conventionalism which applies to geometry. One can extend its application to every
theory. The epistemic status of the claims—empirical or conventional—is not per-
manent. They may be conventional in one theory, but regarded empirical in another.
So whilst in Newtonian mechanics geometry was conventional, in GTR it becomes
empirical. What remains conventional in it is, for example, the global topology of the
universe.
Now, that is precisely Friedman’s conception of ‘dynamic a priori’.8 The only dif-
ference, of course, is that the non-empirical, non-inductive, changeable level is called
‘a priori’, rather than ‘conventional’. A question arises about what exactly the gains
of that shift in terminology should be. As far as I can tell, the point remains obscure.
Whenever Friedman discusses Poincaré’s work, the emphasis is put always on the
advances of GTR of which Poincaré was unaware, thus echoing Reichenbach’s own
misgivings expressed in the letter to Schlick.9 But when he comes to examine Carnap’s
version of conventionalism, he is prepared to identify Carnap’s ‘conventional’ L-rules
from The Logical Syntax of Language with the relativised a priori. Indeed, he remarks
that ‘Carnap articulates a version of Poincaré’s conventionalism that is as general as
possible.’10 Schlick’s and Reichenbach’s own later reading of the theory presented
8 See e.g. Friedman (1999, p. 66).
9 See e.g. Friedman (1999, pp. 83–84).
10 See Friedman (1999, pp. 66–67).
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in Reichenbach (1965) was misleading only because they erroneously endorsed Poin-
caré’s conventionalism about geometry. They ignored its empirical status in GTR and
along with it the possibility of a dynamic a priori. The Logical Syntax of Language
restores to a large extent the vision first presented in Reichenbach (1965).
Friedman’s reading of Reichenbach leads us, therefore, to a generalised version of
conventionalism. And under a different, and Friedman’s preferred, angle, we have
arrived at a circumscribed version of Kantian apriorism. We no longer believe in an
eternal a priori, but we do still believe in a class of assumptions, whatever their name,
that determine the conception of an object for a given theory. But I wish to draw
attention to a particular issue, carrying special significance for Reichenbach’s and
Friedman’s project, which divides sharply between the original version of apriorism
and its watered-down version. If arithmetic and Euclidean geometry reflect immutable
forms of pure intuition and if the objects of experience are equally determined by those
forms, then there is no mystery in applying mathematics in empirical enquiry. Thus
physical space necessarily possesses Euclidean metric: both have the same source.
Kant triumphantly concludes in the Prolegomena:
My doctrine of the ideality of space and time, therefore, so far from making the
whole world of senses into mere illusion, is rather the only means of securing
the application to real objects of one of the most important kinds of knowledge,
namely that which mathematics expounds a priori, and of preventing it from
being held to be mere illusion, because without this observation it would be
quite impossible to decide whether the intuitions of space and time, which we
take from no experience and which yet lie in our representations a priori, were
not mere chimeras of the brain made by us to which no object corresponds, at
least not adequately, and thus geometry itself a mere illusion; whereas on the
contrary, just because all objects of the world of the senses are mere appearances,
we have been able to show the indisputable validity of geometry in respect of
them. (Kant 1953, p. 49)
A Quinean holist, someone who believes in the empirical status of mathematics, may
attempt at a similar argument. Since mathematics and natural science at bottom have
the same empirical source, there is no wonder why mathematical concepts are found
to be useful in empirical research. But if we recognise the a priori character of math-
ematics, we open up a gap: we create a problem of explaining why its concepts are
useful in empirical disciplines. Now a host of issues must be resolved before a proper
debate begins. Perhaps one should in the first place clarify why the problem deserves
any explanation at all.11 But in the framework of Reichenbachian apriorism the prob-
lem receives a neat (Kantian) formulation. Since the role of the relative a priori is
in mediating between the level of mathematics and the level of empirical laws, one
should ask how the relative a priori is possible. We know that the mediation takes
place. But we do not know why it has been successful. Indeed, most of its success is
due to the advances in mathematical physics, the primary foci of Friedman’s account.
11 See Steiner (1998) and Berkovski (2002).
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I conclude that Reichenbach and Friedman have failed in formulating the second
intermediate position referred to above. What I propose to do now is to look at Weyl’s
views that in some aspects overlap Reichenbach’s and which, moreover, were devel-
oped at exactly the same time. Weyl’s account offers a solution to the problem of
mathematical applicability—but with a considerable cost.
5 Weyl on mechanics and electromagnetism
Hermann Weyl underwent many philosophical transformations in his career. At its
various stages he was associated with constructivism, conventionalism, and formal-
ism. Platonist sentiments can occasionally be found in his writings, while Duhemian
holism is a running theme there. He was under the spell of the first Critique in his
youth; later on Fichte and, more significantly, Husserl were among his major influ-
ences. The unusual diversity of Weyl’s philosophical beliefs was no accident. In his
own words, he was like ‘a bumble-bee, flying between different flowers and trying
to draw a little bit of nectar from each one of them’.12 It would therefore be futile
to attribute a single well-argued philosophical doctrine to Weyl. We must regard him
as a mathematician and physicist of the first rate deeply sensitive to the philosophical
perplexities induced by his discipline.
A particular argument to which I wish to draw attention here occurs in the discussion
of stationary electromagnetism in Weyl (1922). Weyl gives a standard, if abridged,
derivation of its field equations. Suppose we have two electric charges q1 and q2 in
the given fragment of space. Coulomb’s Law allows us to describe the force existing
between those charges when they occupy fixed positions. The force exerted on q1 is






Another notion is commonly introduced, namely, the notion of electric field which is
just the force exerted upon the point-charge e:
F = e · E.
We generalise to the case of several charges. The field will be the sum of the contri-









Then we take the integral on the assumption that the charges are distributed in space
with the ‘density’ ρ:
12 See Weyl (1955).
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Now, on the other hand, we can introduce the notion of electric potential computed
by the formula:






whence we get that:
E = −∇φ = − grad φ.
Therefore, since E is a gradient of the scalar field, we have:
∇ × E = curl E = 0. (2)
By Gauss’ Theorem we also determine that the flux of E from an enclosed surface is
equal to the quantity of charges within that surface; therefore:
∇ · E = div E = ρ. (3)
After thus presenting a fairly standard account of electric field—reproduced here with
only minor alterations—Weyl follows up with a densely argued philosophical gloss.
I shall now try to unpack it. Coulomb’s Law describes action at a distance. If any of
the charges is moved, the force exerted by it on another charge will change accord-
ingly. But is such a situation even intelligible? The answer must be in the negative.
Coulomb’s Law provides a way to compute the magnitude of force. But we should
not regard it as explaining what force is. The real explanation is given by the field
equations (2) and (3). And they embody a principle directly opposite to action at a
distance. Combined together, they yield Coulomb’s Law, not vice versa. Yet, why
should we adopt this particular explanatory order? Here is Weyl:
[We] bow to the dictates of the theory of knowledge. Even Leibniz formulated
the principle of continuity, of infinitely near action, as a general principle, and
could not, for this reason, become reconciled to Newton’s Law of Gravitation,
which entails action at a distance and which corresponds fully to that of Coulomb.
The mathematical clearness and the simple meaning of the laws [(2) and (3)] are
additional factors to be taken into account. (Weyl 1922, p. 66)
The ‘general’ principle to which Weyl has resorted is most clearly not part of the
physical theory itself. It is a philosophical principle and it determines the choice of
the physical theory. Its precise epistemic role will have to be clarified further.
Weyl, meanwhile, continues by linking mechanics to physics. There is no separate
empirical science of mechanics. The concept of force is not provided by mechanics.
Newton’s Second Law does not explain what force is; that is, force does not signify
mass × acceleration. That is hardly a controversial view to hold. What one is expected
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to say instead is that Newton’s Second Law allows merely to compute force when the
values for mass and acceleration are given. That is, indeed, what Weyl appears to
claim a little later. But he also insists on a different cryptic remark:
Mechanics does not, however, teach us what is force; that we learn from physics.
The fundamental law of mechanics is a blank form which acquires a concrete
content only when the conception of force occurring in it is filled in by phys-
ics. (Weyl 1922, pp. 66–67, his italics)
What exactly does it mean to say that F = m · a is a blank form? A natural interpreta-
tion would be that, so long as we are confined to mechanics, we are dealing with a mere
mathematical formula devoid of physical content. I believe that we cannot appreciate
the significance of this claim without putting the role of mathematical symbolism into
a wider perspective.
Before we do that, let us finish with Weyl’s argument. For it ends with an energetic
apology for holism. There is a network of laws which cannot be tested individually,
but only as a whole. In the case of electrostatics we have electrons with constant mass
and charge determining the density of the electric field. The field exerts a force calcu-
lated by Coulomb’s Law; in the general form, F = ρ ·E. Given the value of this force,
we calculate the acceleration of the matter by Newton’s Second Law. Weyl concludes:
The laws thus constitute a cycle. . . . We require this whole network of theoret-
ical considerations to arrive at an experimental means of verification,—if we
assume that what we directly observe is the motion of matter. (Even this can be
admitted only conditionally.) We cannot merely test a single law detached from
this theoretical fabric! The connection between direct experience and the objec-
tive element behind it, which reason seeks to grasp conceptually in a theory, is
not so simple that every single statements of the theory has a meaning which
may be verified by direct intuition. (Weyl 1922, p. 67)
Now, the argument does not explain why experience, i.e. an ‘individual’ experience,
cannot intervene in the middle and break up the cycle. One may wonder, in other
words, what that glue is which holds the cycle together and which prevents obser-
vations from falsifying laws in a discrete manner. In the last sentence of the quoted
passage Weyl resorts to a version of meaning holism. On that view, abandoning one
law impacts on the status of another law just by virtue of changing the meaning of the
terms of that latter. But we have not yet seen any justification of it.
6 Symbolic representation
Weyl’s brief discussion leaves us with an uncertain link between the non-intuitive
status of physical laws—or ‘laws of nature’—and holism. The version of holism is
a Duhemian one. Theories cannot be tested individually, and mathematics remains
firmly outside the scope of the empirical. Weyl returns to the same issues nearly forty
years later, shortly before his death in Weyl (1954).13 Let me summarise its major
13 Other congenial remarks are scattered in Weyl (1949) the bulk of which was published in 1926.
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claims. Physical science progresses towards the ever more increasing symbolisation.
And this is to be welcomed. The goal of science is to remove the subjective element of
experience. Symbolic constructions allow us doing exactly that. They do not appeal
to any unique subjective element in cognition, and they are in principle accessible to
every agent to the same extent. Phenomenal qualities are inadequate for understanding
the world, since they are unreliable in generating predictions. They contain too many
accidental features unique to the given experience. By stripping experience of those
phenomenal qualities we arrive at symbolic constructions. They alone provide the
required generality, strong enough to give us the predicting tools.
Mathematical physics, according to Weyl, owes its success to just such a transition
to symbolic representation. What of mathematical symbolism itself? Its key notion
seems to be the notion of a variable. A typical mathematical theorem will have to
be general. For example, given any three numbers a, b, and c, we say that if a < b
and b < c, then a < c. Generality associated with the introduction of variables is
interpreted as a possibility of continuing the procedure indefinitely. It is a hypothetical
generality: if we can provide an actual construction of indefinitely reproducing the
indicated operation, then we are engaging in a typical mathematical activity. And the
same generality is present in other purely theoretical activities. Thus, for instance, we
construct space as a continuum of possible locations.
The claim has the following form. In science we have to account for phenomena
which are not accessible to our immediate experience. Science is occupied with pre-
dictions. As such, it must possess generality. And if it has generality, it necessarily
requires symbolic constructions involving variables. But there is a second, apparently
independent argument to the same effect. If phenomenal qualities are subjective, we
must strive to make them objective and subject-invariant. As we push the boundaries
of the intuitive and visualisable further, we should ultimately remain with nothing but
symbolic constructions. Thus:
Whereas for Huygens colors were ‘in reality’ oscillations of the ether, they now
appear merely as mathematical functions of periodic character depending on
four variables that as coordinates represent the medium of space–time. What
remains is ultimately a symbolic construction of exactly the same kind as that
which Hilbert carries through in mathematics. (Weyl 1949, p. 113)
And there should be no need for tracing the intuitive content of scientific explanations
back to our ordinary perceptions. Such a procedure would require a purely qualitative
explanation and would not even be intelligible.
Weyl’s account contains, then, the following key elements. There is a hierarchy of
disciplines. There is a level of ‘epistemology’, the philosophical enquiry. It supplies
us with general principles, such as the principle of no action at a distance. There is
a level of mechanics providing us with symbolic, that is, mathematical, constructions
devoid of physical content. There is a level of physics that assigns physical meaning
to the formulae of mechanics. But there is a hurdle to clear. The field equations them-
selves are mathematical formulae. Literally put, they cannot tell us what force or any
other physical notion is. The empirical content is assigned to them by epistemological
principles. Therefore, the latter are called to mediate between pure mathematics and
mathematical physics. The idea here, one notices, is remarkably close to Friedman’s
123
76 Synthese (2011) 181:63–77
ideas: the choice of the relative a priori for a particular theory is similarly dictated by
philosophical considerations.14
Given the interrelations between physics, mechanics, and philosophy, the scientific
edifice becomes an organic body and holism is a natural outcome. On one hand,
physical theories rely on the symbolism of mechanics, on the other—they ultimately
follow epistemological assumptions. What of mathematical applicability?
Since science progresses towards objectivity and, that is, towards increased sym-
bolism and formalism, one suspects that the qualitative principles are whittling away
in the process. What remains, or in any case should remain, is a symbolic construction
of reality. Mathematics will be invading the domain of physics, replacing physical
theories with its ‘blank forms’. Why would such an intrusion be legitimate in princi-
ple? Although never spelled out with clarity, Weyl’s ultimate answer is that reality is
‘endowed with a structure’.15 Structures, described axiomatically, would eventually
provide us with a priori knowledge of the world. One feels that this cannot be the
end of the story: there may be mutually inconsistent systems describing incompatible
structures, and the choice will have to be made by means other than mathematical.
Nevertheless the main programmatic claim is clear. Mathematics is applicable to the
study of nature, since nature itself has mathematical properties.
7 Conclusion
Terminological worries aside, Reichenbach’s 1920 theory should, I think, be regarded
as a form of conventionalism. So far as they involve an element of arbitrariness and
decision, relative a priori statements bear less resemblance to Kant’s a priori than
Poincaré’s conventions. Compared with Poincaré’s or even Carnap’s original views,
considerable modifications are involved. Friedman’s interpretation is at its best when
it supplies the philosophical rationale for the Folk View and for the continuity in scien-
tific paradigms. But since in attributing synthetic apriority to arithmetic and geometry
Kant intends to dismiss the challenge of skepticism, there is a good systematic reason
to contrast Kant’s a priori with relative a priori. Kant is able to solve the problem
of mathematical applicability at the cost of making mathematics obey the nature of
human cognition. The theory of relative a priori opens up a gap between the a pri-
ori nature of mathematics and the empirical nature of (mathematical) physics. It is,
therefore, inept in answering the skeptic.
Weyl’s theory, sketchy as it may be, is able to solve the applicability problem, but
at no discount price. Its conclusion is a Pythagorean one: mathematics is useful in
our theories of nature, since mathematical formalism reflects the deep structure of the
world.
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